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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Exculpatory clauses and indemnification clauses are used in 
many contracts to allocate risk between the contracting parties.  
Exculpatory clauses are a contractual waiver of the right to sue, 
executed before the loss occurs.1  Indemnity clauses serve a 
different purpose: shifting a future loss to one of the contracting 
parties, regardless of fault.2  Because both clauses alter the general 
tort concepts of negligence and comparative fault that would 
otherwise apply, they are generally disfavored and strictly construed 
against the benefited party.3  Such clauses can also be void if they 
violate public policy considerations.4 
In Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that exculpatory and indemnification clauses in a 
houseboat rental contract were unenforceable on public policy 
grounds.5  The court found that the rental of houseboats was a 
public or essential service because Voyagaire is a publicly-regulated 
resort and functions as an innkeeper through the rental of 
houseboats.  Therefore, as a matter of public policy, a houseboat 
rental company cannot circumvent its innkeeper duty to protect its 
guests by requiring guests to waive their right to sue the rental 
company for negligence, nor can the rental company shift liability 
for its own negligence onto guests it has a duty to protect.6 
II.   BACKGROUND 
A.   Exculpatory Clauses 
An exculpatory clause contractually waives one party’s right to 
sue before that party knows whether a loss will occur.7  Exculpatory 
clauses or liability releases are generally disfavored because they are 
contrary to the general rule that a party can commence an action 
 
 1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (8th ed. 2004). 
 2. Id. at 784. 
 3. Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 923 (Minn. 1982). 
 4. Id.; see also Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 143-44, 210 N.W.2d 58, 64 
(1973) (holding that an indemnity agreement absolving seller of contact cement 
of liability is void because it violates the public policy that minors should not be 
sold such adhesives). 
 5. 701 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Minn. 2005). 
 6. Id. at 792–93. 
 7. BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 608. 
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against another negligent party and bring that action to fruition.8  
Despite the fact such releases are disfavored, Minnesota appellate 
courts have historically upheld these releases in the business and 
commercial context, such as commercial leases and construction 
contracts.9  These cases rely on principles of freedom of contract, 
i.e., that parties may protect themselves against liability resulting 
from their own negligence so long as the agreement does not 
contravene public policy or public welfare.10  Enforcing such 
agreements allows the parties to contractually bargain for and 
against assumption of risk.11  Stated another way, exculpatory 
clauses distribute the risks inherent in the performance of such 
contracts so as to eliminate foreseeable disputes and reduce the 
cost of the underlying transaction. 
More recently, Minnesota courts have upheld exculpatory 
clauses in cases involving recreational activities.12  The general 
framework for evaluating exculpatory clauses was developed in 
Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc.13  In Schlobohm, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that an injured patron of a health club, by signing a 
 
 8. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, § 92, at 656 (5th ed. 1984). 
 9. See, e.g., Solidification, Inc. v. Minter, 305 N.W.2d 871, 873 (Minn. 1981); 
Great N. Oil Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 291 Minn. 97, 100, 189 N.W.2d 
404, 407 (1971); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 877 v. Loberg Plumbing & Heating Co., 266 
Minn. 426, 434, 123 N.W.2d 793, 798-99 (1963); Speltz Grain & Coal Co. v. Rush, 
236 Minn. 1, 7, 51 N.W.2d 641, 644 (1952); Pettit Grain & Potato Co. v. N. Pac. Ry. 
Co., 227 Minn. 225, 230-31, 35 N.W.2d 127, 130 (1948). 
 10. “[P]ublic policy ‘requires that freedom of contract shall remain inviolate, 
except only in cases which contravene public right or the public welfare.’”  
Arrowhead Elec. Co-Op. Inc. v. LTV Steel Mining Co., 568 N.W.2d 875, 878 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Buck v. Walker, 115 Minn. 239, 244, 132 N.W. 
205, 207 (1911)). 
 11. See e.g., Bunia v. Knight Ridder, 544 N.W.2d 60, 62-63 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B cmt. a (1965) (“The risk of 
harm from the defendant’s conduct may be assumed by express agreement 
between the parties.”)). 
 12. See, e.g., Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 926 (Minn. 1982) 
(injury at health club); Beehner v. Cragun Corp., 636 N.W.2d 821, 828 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2001) (horseback riding); Malecha v. St. Croix Valley Skydiving Club, Inc., 
392 N.W.2d 727, 731-32 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (skydiving); Dailey v. Sports World 
S., Inc., No. A03-127, 2003 WL 22234699, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2003), 
aff’d 683 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2004) (mem.) (scuba-diving class); Ball v. Waldoch 
Sports, Inc., No. C0-03-227, 2003 WL 22039946, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 
2003) (snowmobile racing); Kaltenbach v. Splatball, Inc., No. C7-99-235, 1999 WL 
690191, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 1999) (paintball game); Saude v. Red River 
Racquet Club, Ltd., No. C2-89-500, 1989 WL 103262, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 
12, 1989) (aerobic dance class). 
 13. 326 N.W.2d at 920. 
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membership contract with an exculpatory clause, had validly waived 
her right to sue the health club.14  In determining whether the 
clause was valid, the court analyzed the relationship between the 
parties, the nature of the bargaining transaction, and the type of 
loss for which liability is disclaimed.15  The court held a liability 
release is unenforceable if it is either (1) ambiguous in scope or 
purports to release a party from liability for intentional, willful, or 
wanton acts;16 or (2) violates public policy.17 
1.   Ambiguity in Scope or Release of Intentional Conduct 
An exculpatory clause is ambiguous in scope when it is 
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.18  In 
examining ambiguity, courts follow traditional contract 
interpretation principles by analyzing the contract as a whole.19  In 
other words, when the injury is caused by an accident involving an 
integral aspect of an activity governed by the release, the injury is 
presumptively within the scope of a release.20 
Likewise, an exculpatory clause cannot release a party from 
intentional or willful misconduct.21  The Schlobohm decision was 
unclear as to whether an attempt to exculpate intentional 
misconduct results in the voiding of the entire clause or voiding 
only the portion of the clause attempting to exculpate intentional 
misconduct.22  Since Schlobohm, the decisions of the court of appeals 
 
 14. Id. at 926. 
 15. Id. at 923-26. 
 16. Willful or wanton conduct “is the failure to exercise ordinary care after 
discovering a person or property in a position of peril.”  Beehner, 636 N.W.2d at 
829 (citing Bryant v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 221 Minn. 577, 585, 23 N.W.2d 174, 179 
(1946)). 
 17. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 926. 
 18. Id.; see also Collins Truck Lines, Inc. v. Metro. Waste Control Comm’n, 
274 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Minn. 1979) (upholding an exculpatory clause because it 
has only a single reasonable interpretation). 
 19. Beehner, 636 N.W.2d at 827. 
 20. Malecha v. St. Croix Valley Skydiving Club, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 727, 731 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 21. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 923. 
 22. Id.  Schlobohm stated that an exculpatory clause is unenforceable if the 
clause purports to release intentional conduct, suggesting that perhaps the mere 
attempt to release such conduct renders the entire clause unenforceable.  
However, the cases cited in Schlobohm from other jurisdictions suggest that an 
overbroad clause that included a release of intentional conduct would merely be 
narrowed to negligence claims only.  Id. (citing Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 
(Colo. 1981); Winterstein v. Wilcom, 293 A.2d 821, 824-25 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1972)). 
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have taken divergent approaches to this issue.23 
2.   Public Policy Considerations 
Even if the exculpatory clause is free from ambiguity, the 
courts will not enforce the clause if it violates public policy.  A 
release violates public policy if there is either (a) a disparity of 
bargaining power between the parties to the agreement, or (b) the 
type of service being offered by the benefited party is either a 
public or an essential service.24 
a.   Disparity in Bargaining Power 
A disparity of bargaining power exists if an adhesion contract 
is drafted by a business and forced on an unwilling or unknowing 
public “for services that cannot readily be obtained elsewhere.”25  
An adhesion contract is generally a contract that is for a necessary 
service and presented on a “take it or leave it” basis.26  A party must 
show there was a disparity in bargaining power, or “that there was 
no opportunity for negotiation and that the services could not be 
obtained elsewhere.”27  The fact that a party had no opportunity to 
negotiate the terms of an exculpatory agreement by itself is not 
enough to show a disparity in bargaining power.28  Courts also 
 
 23. Compare Nimis v. St. Paul Turners, 521 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1994) (concluding the release of all claims caused by negligence “or otherwise” 
was an attempt to release intentional misconduct and voided the entire 
exculpatory clause), with Ball v. Waldoch Sports, Inc., No. C0-03-227, 2003 WL 
22039946, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2003) (concluding any attempt to release 
intentional misconduct would result in voiding only the portion of the exculpatory 
clause which attempted to exculpate intentional misconduct).  The Ball court 
relied upon a federal district court decision from Kansas and the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts section 195(1).  See Wolfgang v. Mid-American Motorsports, 
Inc., 898 F. Supp. 783, 787-88 (D. Kan. 1995). 
 24. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 923; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 195(2) (1981) (“A term exempting a party from tort liability for 
harm caused negligently is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if . . . (b) 
the term exempts one charged with a duty of public service from liability to one to 
whom that duty is owed.”). 
 25. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 924. 
 26. Id.; see also Walton v. Fujita Tourist Enters. Co., 380 N.W.2d 198, 201 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding exculpatory clause unenforceable where travel 
agent was presented with a contract containing an exculpatory clause on a “take it 
or leave it” basis). 
 27. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 924-25. 
 28. Malecha v. St. Croix Valley Skydiving Club, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 727, 730 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
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examine whether the party signing the release was a voluntary 
participant in the activity.29 
b.   Type of Service Offered—Public or Essential in Nature 
A public or essential service includes a service “generally 
thought suitable for public regulation.”30  Services considered 
suitable for public regulation have included “common carriers, 
hospitals and doctors, public utilities, innkeepers, public 
warehousemen, [and] employers and services involving extra-
hazardous activities.”31  These types of service providers generally 
have a duty to take reasonable care to protect members of the 
public against foreseeable risk of danger.32 
A public or essential service may also include “services of great 
importance to the public, which were a practical necessity for some 
members of the public.”33  The Schlobohm court did not list 
representative services that are of “practical necessity” to the public, 
but presumably this list would include activities similar to those 
which are generally regulated by statute and required by most 
members of the public, including hospital services, food and water 
services, utility companies, common carriers, and the provision of 
shelter.34 
The Schlobohm court did not comment on whether the service 
at issue must be both suitable for public regulation and of practical 
necessity to the public.  Under either test, however, recreational 
activities generally “do not fall within any of the categories where 
the public interest is involved.”35  Recreational activities include 
snowmobiling,36 skiing,37 horseback riding,38 scuba-diving,39 and 
 
 29. See, e.g., Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925; Beehner v. Cragun Corp., 636 
N.W.2d 821, 828 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Malecha, 392 N.W.2d at 730. 
 30. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925. 
 31. Id. (citations omitted). 
 32. See, e.g., Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 380, 95 N.W.2d 657, 
663 (1959). 
 33. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 926. 
 34. Compare Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d. at 925-26 (noting that “[i]n Minnesota 
there is no statute regulating health clubs, gymnasiums or spas” while determining 
that an exculpatory clause was enforceable because the activity in question was not 
a public service), with Malecha, 392 N.W.2d at 730-31 (holding that an exculpatory 
clause was enforceable because skydiving was not a public or essential service 
despite the presence of federal regulations of “parachute jumping”). 
 35. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925-26. 
 36. Anderson v. Eby, 998 F.2d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1993); Ball v. Waldoch 
Sports, Inc., No. C0-03-227, 2003 WL 22039946, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 
6
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skydiving.40  Minnesota appellate courts have generally held there is 
no special relationship between parties involved in such activities 
because these activities involve personal enjoyment not affecting 
the public interest.41 
B.   Indemnification Clauses 
Indemnity is a remedy that secures the right of one person to 
recover reimbursement from another upon the happening of an 
event.42  Indemnity essentially shifts the loss from one party to 
another, either because the parties have agreed in advance on who 
should bear the loss or because principles of fairness compel the 
shifting.43  The right of indemnity can be contractual or it can arise 
under common law or statute.44 
Contractual indemnity has been used in a variety of 
commercial transactions as a method of allocating who should bear 
a particular loss that may occur in connection with the underlying 
 
2003). 
 37. See Potter v. Nat’l Handicapped Sports, 849 F. Supp. 1407, 1409 (D. Colo. 
1994) (finding that there is no public duty which would prevent enforcement of 
an exculpatory clause required by a ski race organizer because skiing is “neither a 
matter of great public importance nor a matter of practical necessity”); Chauvlier 
v. Booth Creek Ski Holdings, Inc., 35 P.3d 383, 388 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (finding 
that “skiing is a private and nonessential activity”); see also Finkler v. Toledo Ski 
Club, 577 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that the defendant ski 
club was not liable for plaintiff’s death from an accident on a canoe trip because 
plaintiff had knowingly signed a liability waiver). 
 38. Beehner v. Cragun Corp., 636 N.W.2d 821, 827-28 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 39. Dailey ex rel. Tabriz v. Sports World S., Inc., No. A03-127, 2003 WL 
22234699, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2003), aff’d 683 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 
2004) (mem.). 
 40. Malecha v. St. Croix Valley Skydiving Club, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 727, 730 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 41. See Clanton v. United Skates of Am., 686 N.E.2d 896, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1997) (involving injuries at a roller-skating rink and suggesting that to hold the 
release unenforceable would increase the cost of these activities and limit the 
public’s opportunity to participate in them). 
 42. Hendrickson v. Minn. Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 370, 104 
N.W.2d 843, 846 (1960), overruled in part by Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 
N.W.2d 362, 368 n.11 (Minn. 1977). 
 43. Hendrickson, 258 Minn. at 371-72, 104 N.W.2d at 847; Tolbert, 255 N.W.2d 
at 366. 
 44. Tolbert, 255 N.W.2d at 366; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 181.970, subd. 1 (2004) 
(employer shall indemnify its employees under certain circumstances); MINN. 
STAT. § 323A.0401(c) (partnership shall indemnify its partners for certain losses or 
against certain liabilities); MINN. STAT. § 466.07, subd. 1 (municipality shall 
indemnify its employees and officers under certain circumstances). 
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commercial transaction at issue.  Indemnity clauses are commonly 
used in commercial transactions, including commercial 
easements,45 construction contracts,46 product distribution 
agreements,47 agency agreements, franchise agreements, and 
licensing agreements.48 
Minnesota recognizes two types of contractual indemnity 
clauses: (1) indemnity against a loss, where one party agrees to 
reimburse another in the event of a particular loss not within the 
control of either contracting party; and (2) indemnity against 
liability, where one contracting party agrees to protect the other 
contracting party in the event that a third person sues the 
protected contracting party.49  In the latter situation, the indemnity 
clause will often provide that one of the contracting parties (the 
“indemnitor”) will indemnify the other contracting party (the 
“indemnitee”) against claims brought by the third party, even if the 
claim was the result of the indemnitee’s fault or negligence.50  
Minnesota appellate courts have enforced such provisions in 
commercial contexts,51 although the legislature has limited its use 
in certain circumstances.52 
For a period of time, it was unclear whether an indemnity 
clause that shifted fault from one contracting party to another was 
 
 45. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Thornton Bros. Co., 206 Minn. 193, 288 N.W. 
226 (1939). 
 46. See, e.g., Nat’l Hydro Sys. v. M.A. Mortenson Co., 529 N.W.2d 690 (Minn. 
1995); Van Vickle v. C.W. Scheurer & Sons, Inc., 556 N.W.2d 238 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1996). 
 47. See, e.g., Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 143, 210 N.W.2d 58, 64 (1973); 
Osgood v. Med., Inc., 415 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 48. See, e.g., Lake Cable Partners v. Interstate Power Co., 563 N.W.2d 81 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997). 
 49. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Bros, 226 Minn. 466, 469, 33 N.W.2d 46, 48 
(1948) (“Contracts of indemnity may provide for indemnity against loss or damage 
or for indemnity against liability.”). 
 50. Johnson v. McGough Constr. Co., 294 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Minn. 1980), 
superseded in part by statute, MINN. STAT. § 337.02 (2004).  Some contractual 
indemnity clauses merely restate the principles of common law that each party is 
responsible for their own fault.  See, e.g., Ford v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. 
R.R., 294 N.W.2d 844, 846-47 (Minn. 1980) (stating that as long as a party “is not 
‘actively’ or ‘primarily’ negligent, the courts have allowed recovery under the 
[indemnity] clause”). 
 51. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Thornton Bros. Co., 206 Minn. 193, 195-98, 288 N.W. 
226, 227-28 (1939); DeVries v. City of Austin, 261 Minn. 52, 110 N.W.2d 529 
(1961). 
 52. See MINN. STAT. § 337.02, .05 (limiting the enforcement of certain 
indemnity clauses in building and construction contracts). 
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subject to greater scrutiny than other contractual provisions.53  
About twenty-five years ago, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
pronounced that indemnity clauses that shifted fault are indeed 
subject to greater scrutiny, that is, such clauses are subject to “strict 
construction.”54  Indeed, such a clause must contain an “express 
provision” that one party has agreed to indemnify another party for 
the first party’s own negligence, and “such an obligation will not be 
found by implication.”55  Some indemnity clauses have been struck 
down because the strict construction test was adopted, while others 
have been upheld.56 
Even if an indemnity clause passes the strict construction test, 
it must also be consistent with public policy.57  In certain 
 
 53. Compare N. Pac. Ry. Co., 206 Minn. at 196, 288 N.W.2d at 227 (“If a 
contract transgresses the law or contravenes public policy, it is void.  If it does 
neither, the parties are within their rights and the contract should have not an 
arbitrary, that is, an unduly liberal or harshly strict, construction, but a fair 
construction that will accomplish its stated purpose.”), with Christy v. Menasha 
Corp., 297 Minn. 334, 337, 211 N.W.2d 773, 775 (1973) (reading indemnity clause 
as sufficiently broad to indemnify party for injuries resulting from negligent acts). 
 54. Nat’l Hydro Sys. v. M.A. Mortenson, 529 N.W.2d 690, 694 (Minn. 1995) 
(citing Farmington Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Fischer Sand & Aggregate, Inc., 
281 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Minn. 1979), superseded by MINN. STAT. § 337.02 (1994), as 
recognized in Katzner v. Kelleher Constr., 545 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Minn. 1996)). 
 55. See id. 
 56. Compare Braegelmann v. Horizon Dev. Co., 371 N.W.2d 644, 646 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1985) (holding indemnity agreement in standard architectural contract 
was “equivocal at best”), and Fire Ins. Exch. v. Adamson Motors, 514 N.W.2d 807, 
809 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (finding agreement to indemnify lessor “from and 
against any and all losses” was ambiguous and did not explicitly indemnify lessor 
for its own negligence), with Lake Cable Partners v. Interstate Power Co., 563 
N.W.2d 81, 84-87 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that an indemnity clause to 
indemnify against all claims which may be brought against licensor “including 
negligence on the part of [licensor]” was not ambiguous and thus, does not 
require strict construction against the party). 
 57. Minnesota appellate courts have not precisely defined the public policy 
considerations for enforcement of contracts.  Some contracts are expressly 
prohibited by statute.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 337.02, .05 (2004) (indemnity 
agreements in construction contracts are void except in limited circumstances); see 
also MINN. STAT. § 363A.02, subd. 1(a)(1) (securing employee’s rights to be free 
from discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act).  In other cases, the 
contract is not prohibited by statute but still struck down on public policy grounds.  
Generally, public policy is “evidenced by the trend of legislation, judicial decisions, 
or the principles of the common law.  It embraces all acts or contracts which ‘tend 
clearly to injure the public health, the public morals, confidence in the purity of 
the administration of the law, or to undermine that sense of security for individual 
rights, whether of personal liberty or private property, which every citizen has the 
right to feel.’”  Holland v. Sheehan, 108 Minn. 362, 365, 122 N.W. 1, 2 (1909) 
(quoting Goodyear v. Brown, 155 Pa. 514 (1893)).  By the same token, the power 
of a court to declare a contract void on public policy grounds is “delicate and 
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circumstances, Minnesota appellate courts have refused to enforce 
an indemnity agreement when enforcement would be contrary to 
public policy objectives.58  In Zerby v. Warren, a retailer violated a 
statute that forbade the sale of glue containing toluene to a minor, 
resulting in the death of the minor after he “sniffed” the glue.59  
The retailer attempted to enforce an indemnity agreement against 
the glue manufacturer.60  The Minnesota Supreme Court refused to 
enforce the indemnity agreement, finding the statute created an 
absolute duty on the retailer and this fault could not be shifted 
through an indemnity agreement to another party.61  Likewise, the 
court of appeals has also refused to enforce fault-shifting indemnity 
clauses under other circumstances, based on public policy 
grounds.62 
Until the Yang decision, no Minnesota appellate court had 
addressed the use of fault-shifting indemnity agreements in the 
context of a consumer transaction. 
III.  YANG V. VOYAGAIRE HOUSEBOATS, INC. 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
In 2002, Lao Xiong contacted Voyagaire Houseboats to reserve 
a houseboat for a summer vacation with his girlfriend and her 
extended family.63  Voyagaire is located on the shores of Crane 
Lake in northern Minnesota.64  Voyagaire has “the largest 
houseboat rental operation in the Midwest,” and offers its “floating 
 
undefined” and should be exercised only when the case is free from doubt.  Hart 
v. Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 76, 23 N.W.2d 375, 379 (1946). 
 58. See, e.g., Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 143-44, 210 N.W.2d 58, 64 
(1973). 
 59. Id. at 144, 210 N.W.2d at 64. 
 60. Id. at 143, 210 N.W.2d at 64. 
 61. Id. at 144, 210 N.W.2d at 64. 
 62. Lake Cable Partners v. Interstate Power Co., 563 N.W.2d 81, 87 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1997) (upholding indemnity clause in commercial context but holding, for 
“public policy reasons,” that such indemnity obligation does not extend to shifting 
liability for punitive damages); D.W. Hutt Consultants, Inc. v. Constr. Maint. Sys., 
Inc., 526 N.W.2d 62, 65 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to enforce indemnity 
agreement where general contractor did not purchase required worker’s 
compensation coverage and attempted to shift its financial responsibility to its 
employee to another subcontractor). 
 63. Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., 701 N.W.2d 783, 786 (2005). 
 64. Id. 
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homes” for daily and weekly rental.65  Xiong reserved a houseboat 
for a week and, as required by Voyagaire’s policy, paid a “couple 
thousand” dollars in advance for the houseboat.66  The houseboat 
Xiong rented included “five double beds; a penthouse bedroom; 
toilet and shower facilities; a kitchen area, including a refrigerator, 
stove, microwave, and sink; air conditioning; [and] a built-in 
generator.”67 
On June 8, 2002, the vacationing party, consisting of six adults 
and four children, made the four-hour trip as a group from 
Minneapolis to Crane Lake.68  Upon arrival, Xiong met with the 
owner of Voyagaire, who presented Xiong with a houseboat rental 
agreement containing exculpatory and indemnification clauses.69  
This was the first time anyone from Voyagaire had ever mentioned 
the rental agreement, and after looking at the agreement, Xiong 
told the owner he did not understand it.70  The agreement 
contained exculpatory and indemnification clauses which provided 
in relevant part: 
In consideration for being permitted the use of 
Voyagaire Houseboats equipment, the Renter, Lao Xiong, 
his/her family, relatives, heirs and legal representatives do 
hereby waive, discharge and covenant not to sue 
Voyagaire Houseboats * * *, any affiliated companies, or 
any of its officers or members for any loss or damage, or 
any claim or damage or any injury to any person or 
persons or property, or any death of any person or 
persons whether caused by negligence or defect, while 
such rental equipment is in my possession and/or under 
my use as in accordance to the terms stated in this 
agreement. 
I agree to keep said equipment safe and return it to 
Voyagaire Houseboats station from which it was rented 
and in as good condition as when received, and in default 
thereof, I agree to pay all loss and damage they may 
sustain by reason of any such failure and I further agree at 
my cost and expense, to defend and save Voyagaire 
Houseboat[s] harmless on account of any and all suits or 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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demands brought or asserted by reason of injuries to any 
person, persons or property whatsoever caused by the use 
or operation of said equipment while in my possession 
and to pay all judgments, liens or other encumbrances 
that may be levied against Voyagaire Houseboats or the 
said equipment on account of the use thereof.  It is 
further understood and agreed upon that the 
undersigned will be liable for all fines, penalties, citations, 
warnings, and forfeitures imposed for violations of the law 
while the equipment is being held used or operated 
pursuant to this agreement.  Renter agrees that the 
Owner maintains no control over Renter’s use of vessel 
except as set forth in this Agreement.  Therefore, Renter 
shall indemnify and hold harmless Owner from and 
against all claims, actions, proceedings, damage and 
liabilities, arising from or connected with Renter’s 
possession, use and return of the boat, or arising at any 
time during the term of this rental.71 
Voyagaire’s owner told Xiong that  
he did not understand the rental agreement either, but 
assured Xiong that an optional $25 per day insurance fee 
“would cover everything that could happen to the boat.”  
Xiong “took his word,” accepted the insurance, and 
signed the rental agreement.  If Xiong had not signed the 
agreement, Voyagaire would not have allowed him to rent 
the houseboat.72 
During “the evening of June 13 or the early morning of June 
14, several members of the vacationing party began feeling drowsy 
and nauseated.”73  Someone on the boat radioed for help, and 
Xiong and five other persons were taken to the hospital and 
treated for carbon-monoxide poisoning.74 
Xiong and the other members of the vacationing party sued 
Voyagaire for their injuries.75  They claimed that Voyagaire was 
negligent in maintaining the houseboat in a safe and habitable 
 
 71. Id. at 786-87. 
 72. Id. at 787. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 787-88.  Don Russo of Law Offices of Don Russo, P.A., in Miami, 
Florida, and Elizabeth Russo of the Russo Appellate Firm, P.A., in Miami, Florida, 
both represented Lao Xiong as the plaintiff in the suit that he brought against 
Voyagaire.  In Yang, Lao Xiong was a third-party defendant represented by the 
authors. 
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condition; failing to properly inspect the houseboat; failing to 
comply with regulations regarding proper ventilation, safety 
equipment, and devices; and failing to warn of dangerous 
conditions aboard the houseboat, including exposure to carbon 
monoxide.76  Voyagaire in turn: 
[D]enied that it was negligent and alleged that Xiong’s 
claims were barred by the exculpatory clause in the rental 
agreement . . . [and] brought a third-party action against 
Xiong, alleging that he had agreed to indemnify 
Voyagaire from any claim or lawsuit [including 
Voyagaire’s negligence] arising from his use and 
operation of the houseboat.77 
Voyagaire and Xiong moved for summary judgment.78  
Voyagaire sought to enforce the exculpatory and indemnification 
clauses and Xiong argued the clauses were unenforceable.79  The 
district court granted Voyagaire’s motion, dismissed Xiong’s claims 
based on the exculpatory clause, and held Xiong was required to 
indemnify Voyagaire for its own negligence resulting in injuries to 
the other members of the vacationing party.80 
B.   The Minnesota Court of Appeals’ Decision 
1.   The Exculpatory Clause 
The court of appeals applied the enforceability test the 
Minnesota Supreme Court laid out in Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc. to 
Voyagaire’s exculpatory clause.81  The court of appeals concluded 
the exculpatory clause was enforceable because “(1) Voyagaire does 
not provide a necessary or public service; (2) renting a houseboat is 
a recreational activity; (3) there was no disparity in bargaining 
power; and (4) the contract is not ambiguous.”82  With respect to 
the necessary public service prong, the court rejected the argument 
that by renting houseboats for multiple days, Voyagaire was 
 
 76. Id. at 788. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., Nos. A03-1842, A03-2000, 2004 WL 
2049843, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2004) (citing Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, 
Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920 (1982)). 
 82. Id. at *4. 
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furnishing sleeping accommodations to the public, analogous to 
the services provided by an innkeeper.83  The court also concluded 
that houseboats do not fall within the definition of “resort” in the 
statutes, so they are not subject to public regulation as an 
innkeeper.84 
2.   The Indemnification Clause 
The court of appeals also enforced the indemnity clause, 
concluding “the indemnification clause is sufficiently clear, 
sufficiently broad, and is not void on public policy grounds.”85  The 
court of appeals held the language in the indemnification clause 
was sufficiently broad to include claims for Voyagaire’s own 
negligence.86  Furthermore, because the indemnification clause 
included indemnification for any claims “arising at any time during 
the rental,” the plain language “show[ed] Voyagaire’s intent to seek 
indemnification for any claim arising during the rental period,” 
regardless of whether the cause of the claim occurred before the 
renter actually took possession of the houseboat.87  The court also 
concluded that the decisions outlining the strict construction test 
for fault-shifting indemnity agreements applied only to building 
and construction contracts.88 
C.   The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and held both the 
exculpatory clause and indemnification clauses were unenforceable 
on public policy grounds.89  The court concluded that Voyagaire is 
an innkeeper providing a public service of offering sleeping 
accommodations.90  An innkeeper “cannot circumvent its duty to 
protect its guests by requiring a guest to sign a rental agreement 
containing an exculpatory clause,” nor can it shift liability through 
an indemnity clause for their own negligence onto guests whom 
the innkeeper has a duty to protect.91 
 
 83. Id. at *2-3. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at *6. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at *5-6. 
 89. Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., 701 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Minn. 2005). 
 90. Id. at 790. 
 91. Id. at 791-92. 
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1.   The Exculpatory Clause 
In examining the exculpatory clause, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court reiterated the concept that exculpatory clauses are “‘not 
favored,’ and they are ‘strictly construed against the benefited 
party.’”92  The court focused on the public policy consideration of 
whether the rental contract was for a public or essential service.93  
The Schlobohm decision had specifically listed “innkeepers” as 
offering the type of services thought suitable for public regulation 
and thus considered innkeepers as offering an essential service for 
which a party cannot seek exculpation.94  The court examined the 
statutory definition of “resort,” and concluded that the rental of 
houseboats for daily or weekly rental constitutes “resort” functions 
within the statutory framework.95  As a resort offering sleeping 
accommodations to the public in its lodge rooms as well as its 
houseboats, Voyagaire met the statutory definition of an 
“innkeeper.”96  Following up on the reasoning of Schlobohm, the 
court concluded that an innkeeper provides a public service and 
has a duty to take reasonable action to protect its guests.97  The 
court stated, “as a matter of public policy, Voyagaire cannot 
circumvent its duty to protect its guests by requiring the guests to 
sign a rental agreement containing an exculpatory clause that 
purports to release Voyagaire from liability for the resort’s 
negligence.”98  Thus, the exculpatory clause was struck down on 
public policy grounds.99 
 
 92. Id. at 789 (citing Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 923 
(Minn. 1982)). 
 93. Id. at 789-91. 
 94. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925 (citing LaFrenz v. Lake County Fair Bd., 360 
N.E.2d 605, 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977)); see also Winterstein v. Wilcom, 293 A.2d 
821, 824 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (“It is also against public policy to permit 
exculpatory agreements as to transactions involving the public interest, as for 
example with regard to . . . innkeepers.”). 
 95. Yang, 701 N.W.2d at 790 (construing MINN. STAT. § 157.15, subd. 11 
(2004)). 
 96. Id. (construing MINN. STAT. § 327.70, subds. 3-4 (2004)). 
 97. Id. (citing Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 380, 95 N.W.2d 657, 
663 (1959)). 
 98. Id. at 791. 
 99. Id.  In a footnote, the court also noted that the circumstances under 
which the exculpatory clause was signed “suggest that there was some disparity in 
bargaining power between Voyagaire and Xiong,” when the evidence is viewed in 
the light most favorable to Xiong.  Id. at 789 n.3.  However, the court did not rest 
its decision on this second prong of the public policy considerations.  Id. 
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2.   The Indemnification Clause 
With respect to the indemnification clause, the court began 
with the general concept that indemnity clauses which seek 
indemnification for one’s own negligence are not favored and will 
not be enforced unless that intention is expressed in “clear and 
unequivocal terms.”100  After noting that it had previously struck 
down indemnity clauses on public policy grounds, the court 
concluded that, “[a]s a matter of public policy, innkeepers cannot 
shift liability for their own negligence onto the guests they have a 
duty to protect.”101 
The court also noted, in a “broader context,” the unfairness of 
holding a private individual liable for a business’s negligence that 
resulted in serious injury, where the private individual was not 
warned of the specific risks involved.102  In addition, there was no 
precedent in Minnesota or elsewhere upholding a fault-shifting 
indemnification clause under similar circumstances, and the court 
cited a Wyoming federal district court case for the proposition that 
the modern trend is to not enforce indemnity clauses of this type 
on public policy grounds.103 
While it focused on the public policy aspects of its decision, 
the court also concluded that the indemnification clauses at issue 
were not enforceable because the language was not “clear and 
unequivocal.”104  In a footnote, the court noted that the 
indemnification clauses “do not contain language that (1) 
specifically refers to negligence, (2) expressly states that the renter 
will indemnify Voyagaire for Voyagaire’s negligence, or (3) clearly 
indicates that the renter will indemnify Voyagaire for negligence 
occurring before the renter took possession of the houseboat.”105  
The view advanced by the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which had 
concluded that the strict construction test of indemnification 
clauses was limited to building and construction contracts, was 
 
 100. Id. at 791 (quoting Nat’l Hydro. Sys. v. M.A. Mortenson Co., 529 N.W.2d 
690, 694 (Minn. 1995)). 
 101. Id. at 791-92. 
 102. Id. at 792. 
 103. Id. at 793 (citing Madsen v. Wyo. River Trips, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 
1325 (D. Wyo. 1999) (declining to enforce fault-shifting indemnity clause in river 
rafting contract, noting that the “unprecedented attempt to hold a private citizen 
to an indemnity contract for a service that he himself purchased will not stand”)). 
 104. Id. at 792 n.5. 
 105. Id. 
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specifically rejected by the Minnesota Supreme Court here.106 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.   Exculpatory Clauses 
The Yang decision represents a significant benchmark for 
evaluating whether an exculpatory clause will be enforced on 
public policy grounds.  The dispositive factor for the high court was 
the type of service—sleeping accommodations—offered to the 
public, which supported labeling Voyagaire as an innkeeper.  The 
court, in concluding it was appropriate to treat Voyagaire as an 
innkeeper, established that innkeepers have a duty to take 
reasonable action to protect their guests and cannot circumvent 
their duty by requiring guests to waive their right to sue for 
negligence.  It is the first time that the high court struck down an 
exculpatory clause on public policy grounds. 
On the other hand, the decision has limited reach.  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court stayed very close to the analytical 
framework developed in the Schlobohm decision.  Under Schlobohm, 
the public or essential services determination requires 
consideration of (1) whether the type of service is generally 
thought suitable for public regulation, and (2) whether the offered 
service is of practical necessity to the public.107  In Yang, the court 
carefully analyzed the applicable statutes and first concluded that 
Voyagaire was subject to regulation as a “resort” under the 
governing statutes, and second, that Voyagaire—by offering 
sleeping accommodations to the public—was providing a public 
service and therefore could not exculpate its fault.108  In other 
words, the court found that both Schlobohm considerations—public 
regulation and necessary service—were present in this case and 
supported the voidance of the exculpatory clause. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not address whether both 
factors must be present to void the use of an exculpatory clause for 
a particular service.  It is likely, however, that most services of 
practical necessity to the public are already publicly regulated in 
one form or another.  Therefore, there may be little practical 
 
 106. Id. (citing Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., Nos. A03-1842, A03-2000, 
2004 WL 2049843, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2004)).  
 107. Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 925-26 (Minn. 1982). 
 108. Yang, 701 N.W.2d at 790-91. 
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problem with applying Schlobohm and Yang to further cases.  
However, there will always be close cases in which a service may fall 
within one category and not the other.  For example, does the 
mere rental of camping equipment such as tents or sleeping bags 
constitute the offering of public or essential services?  Conversely, 
can a publicly-regulated resort that offers sleeping accommodations 
and other recreational activities use an exculpatory clause for other 
functions of its resort operations, such as horseback riding or water 
skiing?109  The answers to these questions remain to be seen in 
future cases. 
B.   Indemnity Clauses 
The ruling on the indemnity clause has a broader reach.  The 
high court summarily concluded that an innkeeper cannot, as a 
matter of public policy, shift its own causal fault onto guests that it 
has a duty to protect.110  But the court went further and commented 
that it is generally unfair and unprecedented to uphold an 
indemnity clause that would shift the negligence of a commercial 
entity onto a private individual, especially where the individual was 
not warned about the specific risks involved.111  The comments by 
the court make sense: businesses understand risk, insure against 
risk, and typically have attorneys that advise them about risk.  
Private individuals, on the other hand, do not typically carry 
insurance for indemnity obligations they may undertake in the 
context of renting goods or purchasing services.  The court, 
however, did not hold that any indemnity clause in any consumer 
contract could never be upheld, but the comments by the court 
suggest that such clauses should not typically be enforced. 
The decision also addresses the strict construction test 
applicable to indemnity agreements that seek to shift negligence 
from one party to another—and specifically held that the 
indemnity clause at issue is not enforceable under the strict 
construction test.112  This represents the first decision in almost ten 
 
 109. The Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed a similar, but not identical, 
issue in Beehner v. Cragun Corp., 636 N.W.2d 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).  The 
Beehner court upheld an exculpatory clause because the two distinct entities, a 
resort and riding stables, were not a joint venture.  636 N.W.2d at 833.  Thus, the 
court left unanswered the question of whether the exculpatory clause would have 
been voided had the resort owned the riding stables. 
 110. Yang, 701 N.W.2d at 790-91. 
 111. Id. at 792. 
 112. Id. at 791 n.5. 
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years to reiterate the key requirements for ensuring that a fault-
shifting indemnity clause is valid and enforceable; that is, there 
must be a specific reference to negligence, express assumption of 
the negligence of another, and clarity on the scope of the 
indemnity clause.113  The court concluded that the language did 
not “fairly apprise[]” Xiong of an obligation to indemnify 
Voyagaire for the negligence of Voyagaire that occurred before the 
rental term began.114  The ruling calls into question some of the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decisions that did not apply the strict 
construction test with the rigor outlined in the Yang decision.115 
V.   CONCLUSION  
While exculpatory clauses and indemnity clauses are helpful 
tools to allocate risk in appropriate circumstances, the Yang 
decision further defines the limits of these clauses imposed by 
public policy considerations.  Exculpatory clauses will not be 
enforced when the transaction involves a public or essential service.  
Although some uncertainty may exist over whether the purchased 
service must be both publicly regulated and of practical necessity, 
the Yang decision confirms that such clauses are not appropriate 
for certain services such as innkeeping and will not be enforced. 
Likewise, Yang is the first decision to consider the clarity and 
enforceability of a fault-shifting indemnity clause in a private 
consumer transaction.  Not surprisingly, the high court concluded 
that fault-shifting indemnity agreements are not generally 
appropriate for consumer transactions.  In addition, the court 
reiterated that fault-shifting indemnity clauses will be strictly 
construed and must contain an express assumption of fault. 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See, e.g., Bogatzki v. Hoffman, 430 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) 
(upholding an indemnity clause that made an employee injured on the 
employer’s premises liable for the employee’s own negligence); Osgood v. Med., 
Inc., 415 N.W.2d 896, 902-03 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding an indemnity 
clause relating to a heart valve component). 
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